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District of Columbia mayor Anthony Williams
has convinced Major League Baseball to move the
Montreal Expos to D.C. in exchange for the city’s
building a new ballpark. Williams has claimed
that the new stadium will create thousands of jobs
and spur economic development in a depressed
area of the city.
Williams also claims that this can be accom-
plished without tax dollars from D.C. residents.
Yet the proposed plan to pay for the stadium
relies on some kind of tax increase that will like-
ly be felt by D.C. residents.
Our conclusion, and that of nearly all academic
economists studying this issue, is that professional
sports generally have little, if any, positive effect on
a city’s economy. The net economic impact of pro-
fessional sports in Washington, D.C., and the 36
other cities that hosted professional sports teams
over nearly 30 years, was a reduction in real per capi-
ta income over the entire metropolitan area.
A baseball team in D.C. might produce intan-
gible benefits. Rooting for the team might pro-
vide satisfaction to many local baseball fans.
That is hardly a reason for the city government
to subsidize the team. D.C. policymakers should
not be mesmerized by faulty impact studies that
claim that a baseball team and a new stadium
can be an engine of economic growth.
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Introduction: The D.C.
Baseball Deal
The September 28, 2004, press conference
at the Washington City Museum was a lively
affair. As the Washington Post described it: “The
mood in the City Museum’s Great Hall was
near-giddy. John Fogerty’s stadium anthem,
‘Centerfield,’ blared over loudspeakers. A
crowd of kids, some wearing baseball uni-
forms and carrying balls, hunted for auto-
graphs from former Washington Senators.”1
The press conference was the culmination of
years of haggling with Major League Baseball
to bring the first baseball team to D.C. since
the Washington Senators left in 1971. 
More hard work is to be done, however.
Williams now has to convince a majority of
the D.C. Council to approve his plan to use tax
money and the power of city government to
build a new state-of-the-art ballpark for the
team. To win support and council votes, he
has touted the perceived economic benefits
that will come from having baseball in D.C.
again. Unfortunately for Mayor Williams, his
claims do not withstand scrutiny.
The practice of professional sports teams
profiting at the expense of taxpayers is not new.
The gambit routinely involves an individual
franchise using its monopoly power to extract
concessions from state and local governments.
The Washington case differs because Major
League Baseball, not the Expos, played the role
of the monopolist pitting one potential suitor
against another in search of the best deal.
However, make no mistake: Major League
Baseball’s protracted decisionmaking process
as it mulled over the relative merits of various
locations—Washington; Northern Virginia;
Portland, Oregon; Charlotte, North Carolina;
San Juan, Puerto Rico; Monterrey, Mexico; and
the other cities bidding for the franchise—was
a classic exercise in concession extraction by a
monopoly sports league. 
Mayor Williams and others who wanted to
lure the team to Washington and now want to
build a new stadium claim that average D.C.
taxpayers will not be burdened with the costs.
Williams stated in his “Message from the
Mayor” for October 1, 2004, that “the ballpark
will be 100% financed by the team owners,
those who use the ballpark, and by DC’s
largest businesses . . . our residents will not be
asked to pay one dime of tax dollars toward
this ballpark.”2
According to Williams’s proposed plan, the
revenue to finance the construction of the
baseball stadium will come from rent paid by
the baseball team to use the new facility; taxes
on tickets sales, concessions, parking, and
merchandise sold within the stadium; and a
“ballpark fee” (read: tax increase) on some of
the District’s largest corporations.
First, the team’s share of financing the sta-
dium is a 30-year lease committing the team
to an initial rent of $3.5 million each year,
increasing to $5 million by the fifth year, and
then increasing by 2 percent minus $10,000
per year thereafter.3 Of course, the conven-
tional idea behind a lease is that a tenant pays
rent for the use of a facility owned by some-
body else. So the team will be renting the facil-
ity but will not be paying for its construction—
despite the fact that the touted economic ben-
efits that will follow in the wake of the team
relocating to the District depend on the team
being successful and profitable. Major league
sports teams are certainly not mom-and-pop
operations and can pay entirely for the con-
struction of their own stadiums. 
According to calculations of economist
Scott Wallsten at the AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, the rent the
baseball team will pay “is almost certain to
decrease every year after 2009 when account-
ing for inflation. If inflation averages 3 per-
cent over 30 years, the [team] will be paying
about $3.3 million per year in today’s dollars
by 2035.”4 Thus, in just five years, D.C. taxpay-
ers will be forced to provide another implicit
concession—a de facto rent subsidy—to the
baseball team. 
Second, taxes will be collected on ticket
sales, concessions, parking, and merchandise
sold within the stadium. Concessions and
merchandise are, in common parlance, food












souvenirs. It is likely that the D.C. residents
who purchase food, beverages, and clothing
while attending games would have chosen to
eat and purchase clothes in D.C.—and pay
taxes on those purchases—in the absence of
the stadium and franchise. In other words, rev-
enues generated inside the stadium may not
be new revenues, even if they are dedicated
specifically to paying for the new stadium. 
Finally, a “ballpark fee” will be imposed on
the largest corporations in D.C. Whether it is a
surcharge or an increase in the corporate
income tax rate, this so-called fee is a tax
increase, pure and simple. Moreover, this tax
will fall on D.C. residents if they happen to be
owners or employees of the affected business-
es, or if they purchase the goods or services
produced by those businesses. Thus, claiming
that D.C. residents will not feel the burden of
this corporate tax increase is disingenuous.
Corporations do not pay taxes, people do.
Whether it is in the form of lower wages for
workers, lower asset values for corporate own-
ers, or higher prices for consumers of the
goods and services those companies provide,




The proponents of new stadiums and fran-
chises argue that there will be substantial eco-
nomic benefits from proposed facilities and
teams.5 Indeed, a report from the District’s
Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and
Economic Development claims that the team
and ballpark will “create 360 jobs earning an
annual total of $94 million.”6 That amounts
to an astounding $261,111 per job. The won-
der is that anyone finds such figures credible.
Yet decade after decade, cities throughout the
country have struggled to attract or keep pro-
fessional sports teams, and the idea that a
team brings with it large economic gains
invariably arises. Part of this process is the
commissioning of economic impact studies
that purport to show just how much benefit
the city or region will reap. As it turns out,
claims of large tangible economic benefits do
not withstand scrutiny. Careful analysis of
past economic experience in cities that built
new stadiums and attracted new teams does
not bear out those claims.7
Impact studies rely on what economists call
input-output models of local or regional
economies into which the team and its new sta-
dium are introduced to estimate the prospec-
tive economic impact. Those studies ask the
question: what will happen if a new franchise
and stadium enter this community? The results
of those studies invariably reflect the desires of
the people who commission them, and advo-
cates of stadiums and franchises typically pro-
duce impact studies that find large economic
benefits from building a stadium or enticing a
team to relocate to the city.
All impact studies use multipliers to esti-
mate the effect of each dollar spent directly
on sports on the wider local economy. The
multiplier effect implies that the dollars
spent on sports entertainment will have rip-
ple effects throughout the local economy.
Critics argue that at best the multipliers used
in prospective impact studies overstate the
contribution that professional sports make
to an area’s economy because they fail to dif-
ferentiate between net and gross spending.8
In computing the benefits of investment
in a stadium, the appropriate focus is on net
benefits, that is, benefits that would not have
occurred in the absence of the stadium.
Impact studies rarely consider what econo-
mists call the substitution effect. Indeed, not
all the spending generated around and in the
stadium is new spending, and not all the
taxes on that spending are net new tax rev-
enues. As sport- and stadium-related activi-
ties increase, other spending declines because
people substitute spending on sports for
other spending. That is called the substitu-
tion effect. If the stadium simply displaces
dollar-for-dollar spending that would have
occurred otherwise, there are no net benefits
generated. To classify all consumer spending
on stadium- and sport-related activities as a

















stitution effect greatly overstates the value of
the investment. 
Many fans attending the new team’s games
will come from the Maryland and Virginia
suburbs. Those fans will bring their entertain-
ment spending from the suburbs into the dis-
trict—unless, of course, they would have fre-
quented D.C. restaurants, bars, nightclubs,
parking lots, and other businesses even with-
out a baseball team in D.C. Put another way,
suppose Joan Suburban has a season subscrip-
tion to the National Symphony Orchestra.
Every month or so, she leaves her Silver Spring
condo, drives into the District for a few drinks
and a meal in a Georgetown restaurant, and
enjoys a concert. As she is also a baseball fan,
Joan declines to renew her NSO subscription
next year and instead buys a partial-season
ticket plan for the new team. Every month or
so, she leaves her Silver Spring condo, drives
into the District for a few drinks and a meal in
the revitalized area around the new ballpark,
and enjoys a ball game. How much new eco-
nomic benefit does the District gain? The
mayor would have us believe that every dollar
she spends should be counted as economic
benefit attributable to the stadium. But what
about the business lost by the Georgetown
restaurant and parking lot?
The more suburban fans reduce their pur-
chases at shops and eateries in other parts of
D.C. and replace those purchases with ball-
game spending, the lower the net impact of
the stadium and franchise on the city’s over-
all level of business development. It is any-
one’s guess how much of any new spending
will flow into establishments outside the sta-
dium and how much will be spent inside the
stadium. Mayor Williams’s case for building
a stadium financed with tax revenue rests on
the assumption that suburban residents of
Maryland and Virginia who don’t currently
spend their entertainment dollars in the
District will rush to do so once baseball sea-
son begins.
Previous studies have found this substitu-
tion effect in other cities. Economists Robert
Baade and Alan Sanderson looked at the eco-
nomic growth patterns of cities that hosted
sports teams. On the basis of evidence from
10 metropolitan statistical areas over the
period of 1958 to 1993, they found that
leisure spending was realigned, not increased,
and an insufficient number of fans were
attracted from beyond the area to signifi-
cantly contribute to the city’s economy.9
Moreover, at least some of the redistribu-
tion in spending will be across neighbor-
hoods within the district; a little less spend-
ing by D.C. residents in bars and restaurants
in Georgetown or on Connecticut Avenue
merely offset by a bit more spending in bars
and restaurants that spring up around the
ballpark is not obviously an improvement for
the city of Washington.
In addition to the substitution effect, some
economists have posited that there is a simul-
taneous effect at work. Dubbed by economists
John Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist as the
“leakages and multipliers” effect, the theory
suggests that—to the extent sport spending
has a multiplier effect at all—spending on
sports may have a much lower local multiplier
than spending on other entertainment
goods.10 In other words, nonsports entertain-
ment spending has a bigger ripple effect in the
economy than sports-related entertainment
spending. Therefore, the economic gains from
sports-related spending will never be large
enough to fully offset the economic loss from
a decline in nonsports entertainment spend-
ing. This reduction in earnings for nonsports
industries would lead to a reduction in the
earnings of workers in non-sports-related
occupational groups. As our study of the eco-
nomic effects of sports teams in other cities
indicates, those two influences could have the
likely effect of dragging down net incomes in
D.C. on the arrival of the baseball team.
Sports Teams and Stadiums
as a Drag on Economic
Growth: An Analysis of 
the Data
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most economic impact studies commissioned
by teams or stadium advocates, the academic
research overwhelmingly concludes that the
presence of professional sports teams has no
measurable positive impact on economic
growth as measured by the level of real income
in cities over a 35-year period. Our own
research suggests that professional sports may
actually be a drain on local economies rather
than an engine of economic growth.
The difference between the impact studies
commissioned by teams or cities and the aca-
demic literature is more than simply a matter
of prospective estimates versus retrospective
facts. Academic studies consider a large num-
ber of metropolitan areas with major league
professional sports over a long period of time
and examine a variety of factors that are like-
ly to predict either aggregate economic activ-
ity or the vitality of specific sectors of the
local economy. In other words, those studies
look specifically for the net effect of the
sports environment on the economic health
of metropolitan areas.
Our research examines all 37 U.S. cities
that had one or more professional football,
basketball, or baseball franchises between
1969 and 1996. The data set contains a wide
variety of franchise movement and new stadi-
um and arena construction. 
We focus on identifying factors that affect-
ed either the level or the growth of income per
person. Although attracting a new football
team or building a new basketball arena might
have had some effect on those variables, other
factors certainly played an important role.
Our approach is to quantify the sports envi-
ronment by taking into account the presence
of franchises, franchise entry and departure,
stadium construction and renovation, the
location of new stadiums and arenas, and the
“novelty effect” of a new stadium or arena for
professional football, basketball, or baseball.11
We then estimate econometric models of the
level or growth rate of income in metropolitan
areas and include the variables reflecting the
sports environment. 
Taking advantage of the time-series cross-
sectional nature of our data, we are able to
control for city-specific factors that affect
income per person, or wages per worker and
employment in each of several sectors, includ-
ing factors such as the decline of rust-belt
cities and booms in sun-belt cities, and the
effect of the business cycle. The use of city-spe-
cific effects, and the other variables, means
that we are able to make sure that the estimat-
ed effects of the sports environment variables
are not contaminated with other historical or
location-specific influences on the economic
vitality of the cities. 
The results of our analysis indicate the fol-
lowing:
• The presence of pro sports teams in the
37 metropolitan areas in our sample had
no measurable positive impact on the
overall growth rate of real per capita
income in those areas.
• The presence of pro sports teams had a
statistically significant negative impact
on the level of real per capita income in
our sample of metropolitan areas.
• The presence of pro sports teams had a
statistically significant negative impact
on the retail and services sectors of the
local economy. The average effect on
employment in the services sector of a
city’s economy was a net loss of 1,924 jobs
as a result of the presence of a profession-
al sports team.
• The presence of pro sports teams tended
to raise wages in the hotels and other
lodgings sector by about $10 per year.
But it tended to reduce wages per work-
er in eating and drinking establishments
by about $162 per year.
• The presence of pro sports teams tended
to raise the wages of workers in the
amusements and recreation sector by
$490 per year. However, this sector
includes the professional athletes whose
annual salaries certainly raise the aver-
age salary in this sector by an enormous
amount. As it turns out, those workers
most closely connected with the sports
environment who were not professional









than an engine of
economic growth.
earnings as a result of the local profes-
sional sports environment.12
The tables summarize the findings rele-
vant to a discussion of the potential econom-
ic impact of baseball in Washington, D.C.
They show the overall effect of the presence
of professional football, basketball, and base-
ball teams on earnings and employment in
each of several sectors of the economy. 
Our calculations also accounted for the
effects of a variety of other local economic con-
ditions on earnings and employment. On the
basis of the estimated relationships, we com-
puted the average effect of a professional base-
ball team and stadium on earnings, holding
constant all other pertinent economic factors.
The results are given in Table 1. We found
that, on average, professional baseball lowered








Average Change in Earnings by Sport and Industry
Football Basketball Baseball
Earnings in eating and drinking establishments, 
per employee $6 -$17 -$144
Earnings in amusements and recreation, per employee $1,200 -$173 -$503
Earnings in hotels and other lodging establishments, 
per employee -$75 $155 -$38
Source: Dennis Coates and Brad R. Humphreys, “The Effect of Professional Sports on Earnings and Employment in
the Services and Retail Sectors in U.S. Cities,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 33 (2003).
Table 2
Average Change in Employment by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and Sector
MSA Services Retail MSA Services Retail
Atlanta -4,499 -2,351 New Orleans 869 -444
Baltimore -1,796 -2,983 New York 13,930 -2,551
Boston -6,409 110 Oakland -2,512 -910
Buffalo -509 -714 Orange Co -2,234 -3,996
Charlotte 1,035 268 Orlando 556 193
Chicago 1,213 -5,107 Philadelphia -4,495 -3,956
Cincinnati -4,732 -3,307 Phoenix 987 1,087
Cleveland -3,199 -4,907 Pittsburgh -4,294 -4,384
Dallas -6,245 -2,752 Portland -96 907
Denver -2,956 -4,744 Sacramento 809 346
Detroit -5,224 -3,347 St. Louis -801 -2,947
Green Bay 1,245 -579 Salt Lake City 443 537
Houston -2,454 -2,599 San Antonio 961 722
Indianapolis 3,049 1,456 San Diego -4,496 -3,908
Kansas City -12,211 -3,266 San Francisco -3,709 -4,408
Los Angeles -3,490 -3,224 Seattle -2,384 -1,789
Miami -1,092 -905 Tampa 742 -67
Milwaukee -7,851 -2,405 Washington -1,274 -902
Minneapolis -4,292 -3,367
Source: Dennis Coates and Brad R. Humphreys, “The Effect of Professional Sports on Earnings and Employment in
the Services and Retail Sectors in U.S. Cities,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 33 (2003).
establishments by about $144 per employee
per year. Baseball also lowered the per employ-
ee annual earnings of workers in the hotel and
lodging sector by about $38. Most striking of
all, baseball lowered the annual earnings of
workers in the amusements and recreation
sector by $503. The last result is impressive in
part because it includes the salaries of the
baseball players themselves. 
Those results suggest that there is a great
deal of substitution of economic activity related
to professional baseball for other amusement
and recreation activities in cities that host teams.
That substitution harms workers employed in
alternative entertainment and recreation activi-
ties. This evidence stands in stark contrast to the
pie-in-the-sky forecasts used to justify subsidiz-
ing a professional baseball team. 
The results we have just reported are based
on the actual experience of U.S. cities with pro-
fessional baseball over a period of nearly 30
years. The economic benefits touted by Mayor
Williams are predictions about future econom-
ic impacts based on a flawed methodology.
Table 2 shows the effects of the presence of
professional football, baseball, and basketball
teams on employment in various sectors in
each city. Table 3 shows the effect on earnings. 
Rather than use average values of stadium
capacity, for example, we use the exact values of
the variables for each of the 37 cities. In this way
we are able to compute the effect of sports on
earnings and employment in each of the cities.
The clear implication of Table 2 is that the pres-
ence of professional sports in the Washington
metropolitan area has, on average, sapped some
strength from the service and retail sectors.
Admittedly, the data do not include the com-
pletion of the MCI Center. Yet the effects of the
center’s presence in D.C. probably included a
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Table 3
Average Change in Earnings by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and Sector
MSA Food/Drink Amusements Hotels MSA Food/Drink Amusements Hotels
Atlanta -$199 $1,077 - New Orleans $0 $2,217 -$110
Baltimore -$182 $353 - New York -$594 -$3,993 -$843
Boston -$153 -$500 - Oakland -$171 $47 -
Buffalo -$17 $2,037 - Orange Co -$284 $103 -$683
Charlotte $6 $160 $205 Orlando -$6 - -
Chicago -$515 -$1,553 -$715 Philadelphia -$265 $890 -
Cincinnati -$143 - $568 Phoenix -$38 $330 $170
Cleveland  -$393 - -$798 Pittsburgh -$189 $1,063 -
Dallas -$197 $1,470 $1,370 Portland -$42 -$390 $28
Denver -$448 $160 - Sacramento -$12 -$3 -
Detroit -$209 $1,873 - St. Louis -$165 $267 -
Green Bay -$20 $1,350 - Salt Lake City -$21 -$143 $123
Houston -$189 $430 $538 San Antonio -$30 -$213 $273
Indianapolis -$19 $140 - San Diego -$223 $710 $173
Kansas City  -$157 - - San Francisco -$241 $977 -$303
Los Angeles -$214 $2,077 -$373 Seattle -$180 $877 $1,088
Miami -$46 $2,237 - Tampa -$1 $1,550 $43
Milwaukee -$239 -$3,057 $445 Washington -$54 -$33 -
Minneapolis  -$127 - -
Source: Dennis Coates and Brad R. Humphreys, “The Effect of Professional Sports on Earnings and Employment in the Services and
Retail Sectors in U.S. Cities,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 33 (2003).
- Indicates that this effect could not be estimated because the relevant data were not available for that MSA. 
substitution effect similar to the ones we see
elsewhere. Our results do, however, reflect the
long presence of the Redskins, the arrival of the
Bullets (Wizards) from Baltimore in 1973, and
the departure of the Senators for Texas in 1971.
These figures, like those in Table 1, should give
pause to even the staunchest believer in the
claim that bringing professional baseball to
Washington will lead to significant positive eco-
nomic benefits on net.
Because we developed a wide variety of
measures of the sports environment in met-
ropolitan areas, many of the individual ele-
ments have a positive impact in one sector
that is offset by a negative impact in another
sector. For example, on average, the arrival of
a new basketball franchise in a metropolitan
area increases real per capita income by about
$67. But building a new arena for that bas-
ketball team reduces real per capita income
by almost $73 in each of the 10 years follow-
ing the construction of the arena, leading to
a net loss of about $6 per person. 
Similarly, in cities that have baseball fran-
chises, the net effect of an existing baseball
team playing in a 37,000-seat baseball-only
stadium (the average capacity of the baseball
stadiums in our data set) is a $10 reduction
of real per capita income. This last point is
particularly relevant for the D.C. situation.
Although the proposed stadium undoubted-
ly will be larger than the average in our data
set, the net effect will not likely be smaller
than the $10 we estimated. 
Note also that the waiters, waitresses,
cooks, busboys, and other workers in the eat-
ing and drinking establishments that will arise
will largely be D.C. residents. They are, pre-
sumably, precisely the people whom the stadi-
um proponents argue will benefit from build-
ing the ballpark. But our estimates reveal that
those people are harmed or experience, at best,
only a very modest increase in incomes.
Conclusion
The policy implications of our results are
no different from those of the previous stud-
ies that found no positive relationship
between the presence of pro sports teams and
growth in local economies. The evidence sug-
gests that attracting a professional sports
franchise to a city and building that franchise
a new stadium or arena will have no effect on
the growth rate of real per capita income and
may actually reduce the level of real per capi-
ta income in that city. Moreover, specific sec-
tors of the economy that are frequently pre-
dicted to be the big winners from stadium
construction are likely to benefit very little or
even be harmed by it. Yet government deci-
sionmakers and politicians continue to try to
attract professional sports franchises to cities
or to use public funds to construct elaborate
new facilities to woo them. One thing is clear
from the evidence: pro sports team owners
are reaping substantial benefits for their
teams by touting sports as an effective tool
for economic development. 
The impact study commissioned by
Mayor Williams’s office contains most of the
flaws that have led economists to criticize
such studies for decades. The pronounce-
ments that no local tax dollars will go to sta-
dium construction amount to economic
hand waving.
If the actual economic impact of the pro-
posed new baseball stadium in D.C. ends up
resembling the economic impact of profes-
sional sports teams on other U.S. cities in the
past, then at best this stadium will have no
effect on the local economy. At worst, some
sectors of the economy—businesses located
near the new stadium and workers in closely
related occupations—will benefit while oth-
ers will lose, and the overall impact on the
economy will be zero or negative. 
A baseball team in D.C. might produce
intangible benefits. Residents might have an
enhanced sense of community pride and
another opportunity to engage in a shared
experience of civic expression. Perhaps some
people will think that D.C.’s image as a “world-
class city” will be further burnished. Rooting
for the team will provide satisfaction to many
local baseball fans. Yet those intangible bene-













fans of the baseball team and showing their
support by purchasing tickets to games and
team paraphernalia. That is hardly a reason for
the city government to subsidize construction
of a ballpark, or for the baseball team to avoid
paying the cost to build it. District policymak-
ers should not be mesmerized by the faulty
impact studies that claim a baseball team and
new stadium can be an engine of economic
growth.
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